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Abstract Neuroeconomic studies are liable to fall into the reverse inference fal-
lacy, a form of affirmation of the consequent. More generally neuroeconomics relies
on two problematic steps, namely the inference from brain activities to the
engagement of cognitive processes in experimental tasks, and the presupposition
that such inferred cognitive processes are relevant to economic theorizing. The first
step only constitutes the reverse inference fallacy proper and ways to correct it
include a better sense of the neural response selectivity of the targeted brain areas
and a better definition of relevant cognitive ontologies for neuroeconomics. This
second way also allows increased coherence between the cognitive processes
actually involved in neuroeconomics experiments and the theoretical constructs of
economics. We suggest means of increasing neural response selectivity in neuro-
economic experimental paradigms. We also discuss how the choice of cognitive
ontologies can both avoid implicit reductionist strategies (from economic constructs
to neural patterns) and irrelevance, as cognitive processes engaged in experimental
tasks may lack immediate bearing on the study of economic behavior. With these
joint improvements neuroeconomics can be a progressive science.
Keywords Neuroeconomics  Reverese inference fallacy  Cognitive ontologies 
Reductionism  Cultural neural recycling
1 Introduction
Neuroeconomics has been defined as the investigation of neural correlates of
decision-making, in choice situations which may be of interest to the economist and
with the prospect of enriching or revising some theoretical assumptions of the
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economic science (Sanfey et al. 2006). It is not our purpose here to assess the
likeliness that neural data really can change the theoretical foundations of economics.
This problem has been addressed elsewhere (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Bourgeois-
Gironde and Schoonover 2008). In particular it has been doubted that theoretical
constructs of neuroscience, economics and psychology are commensurable. Our more
specific concern here is with the possibility to infer cognitive processes and mental
states—which are assumed themselves to be relevant to an understanding of
economic behavior—from observed neural activities. This inference constitutes a
crucial conceptual link for neuroeconomics. Without postulating conceptual identity
or overlap between constructs of different disciplines, inferential steps between neural
observations and mental or behavioral concepts would give sense to frequently stated
three-tiered conclusions in neuroeconomic studies which from the observation of
given neural patterns conclude to the presence of cognitive processes and/or mental
states and, eventually, to the incorporation of a new psychological feature in a utility-
maximization functional form.
Our discussion in the following bears essentially on the first inferential link. We
will start by stating in what way the problem of reverse inference, which looms over
psychological interpretations of brain-imaging data in general, affects some
important neuroeconomic studies and then consider under what conditions and
constraints this problem can be bypassed. Only at the end will we raise the more
general issue of the relevance of drawing and validating such inferences as forming
the core research program in neuroeconomics. This issue will connect back to the
main epistemological difficulty met by neuroeconomists which is to make sense of
integrating neural data in economic models. One way of doing so would be to assert
that economic behaviors are ultimately reducible—by means of intermediating valid
inferences—to neural data. But most generally neuroeconomists do not care about
holding a reductionist view of the mind and are happy to correlate inferred mental
states or cognitive processes based on a functional analysis of some observed neural
activities with behavioral patterns that make sense with respect to some intended
economic model. But those correlations are not innocent. Even though they do not
necessarily entail reductionism, they might rely on a naı¨ve view of the reliability of
correlations between observed neural activity and cognitive processes or mental
states. This may actually amount to a reification problem1 which appears when
neuroeconomists dogmatically assume that their theoretical constructs successfully
capture behavioral patterns and cognitive processes and that neural bases observed
in correlations with these patterns and processes are neurobiological realizations of
those constructs. So even if neuroeconomists do not really philosophically care
about the ultimate biological constituents of behavior, they should nevertheless feel
concerned about the validity of these basic correlations in order not to fall into
unwanted reductions. The reification problem is independent from the reverse
inference fallacy but the confidence that researchers may have in having observed
the neural bases of their constructs may nevertheless bias them toward its
unreflective use.
1 I thank Nicholas Bardsley for having suggested this label and for many comments and improvements
on this article.
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Epistemological safety may be restored in two ways: either by complying with
the constraints that license functional inferences from observed neural patterns to
cognitive processes and states, or by relying on an altogether different way of
interpreting neurobiological mechanisms which underlie economic behavior. We
discuss the nature of those constraints and how some extent neuroeconomic studies
meet with them with variable success. The use of cognitive ontologies is the most
straightforward way to address those informational constraints and improve the
likeliness of drawn reverse inferences. They consist in databases of extant
correlations between neural activities and functional and psychological descriptions.
In that way they can also be considered architectures which reflect current
assumptions about human cognition. In the final section we give a hint of an
alternative approach to apprehend the connection between neural data and economic
constructs and of its potential epistemological relevance for neuroeconomics.
In Sect. 2 we recall what the general problem of reverse inference is and how it
threatens the neuroeconomic enterprise. In Sect. 3 we address the special point of
neural selectivity which, when sufficiently high, allows for a Bayesian inference
from a given observed neural pattern to a particular cognitive process. We give
examples of salient neuroeconomic studies which, we deem, do not sufficiently
meet this criterion of neural selectivity. In Sect. 4 we indicate how neuroeconomics
may resort to cognitive ontologies to improve the information about the selectivity
of observed neural activities with respect to intended cognitive processes in the run
experimental tasks. We also consider whether the way conclusions of neuroeco-
nomic studies are usually stated does not point to implicit and often unwanted
reductionist strategies. An alternative strategy can be explicitly stated which makes
the choice of cognitive ontologies possibly relevant to neuroeconomics dependent
on background evolutionary hypotheses about how some specific brain areas may
have evolved in order to fit with regular features of economic environments. Given a
three-fold caveat on methodological improvements on control of neural selectivity,
choice of cognitive ontologies, and theoretical relevance of the intended cognitive
processes and their presumably associated neural ones, the position advocated here
is that neuroeconomics can escape the reverse inference fallacy.
2 The problem of reverse inference in neuroeconomic studies
There is much current interest in using brain-imaging techniques in order to obtain a
better understanding of the nature of cognition. Several techniques can be used.
Some of them, like MEG and EEG, capture the information that is carried on by the
brain’s electric activities; others such as fMRI and NIRS rely on hemodynamic
changes in the cortex.2 Given the accumulation of brain imaging data during the
past two decades we presumably have acquired a stable functional cartography of
2 Magneto-encephalography (MEG) and electro-encephalograhy (EEG) are techniques for mapping brain
activity by recording respectively magnetic or electric fields occurring naturally in the brain. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures the change in blood flows in the brain due to neural
activity. Near-infrared spectroscopy is an optical method using the correlation between infrared light-
waves transmission and metabolic activity in the brain.
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the brain, namely the possibility to localize functions in areas with a high level of
accuracy and precision. However, the incremental process through which such a
mapping can grow up in the course of a systematic functional exploration of the
brain is far from inferentially sound. Namely, the transition from one set of
functional observations to another may be more dependent on analogical reasoning
than on deductive validity. A slippery logical practice has indeed pervaded the field
which consists in inferring to the engagement of a particular cognitive process from
the activation of a particular brain region on the sheer basis of similar past
inferences. This logical move is called a reverse inference. It is not deductively
valid even though, as we shall see, it can provide some information under some
precisely defined conditions.
Many neuroeconomic studies, in different ways and to variable extents, seem to
us to follow this pattern of reasoning. We provide a set of 5 examples from the
recent neuroeconomic literature, which we have schematized in order to make
salient this underlying logical structure. We start with the most widespread and
obvious reverse inference fallacy, which in study 1 below may be rather innocuous
to the extent that the intended correlation between a given neural pattern and a
cognitive process is explicitly based on previous similar studies. In the following
studies 2–5 the reverse inference fallacy is less benign to the extent that authors
seem to directly look for the neural realization of some economic theoretical
constructs. In studies 2 and 3 authors seem to infer from neural activity to their
intended theoretical constructs on the doubly frail basis of too weak support by
extant correlations between the same neural activities and similar or sufficiently
close cognitive processes, and of available possible alternative interpretations of the
observed brain activities. In example 4 the problem is with the gross-grainedness
and, therefore, lack of selectivity of the neural systems said to correlate with an
economic modeling of behavior. In 5 most of those defects seem to be under control
except for the fact that we can point to a local strategy of drawing inferences on the
basis of previous reverse inferences made in analogous neuroeconomic
investigations.
1. Padoa-Schioppia and Assad (2006) have identified a population of neurons in
the orbitofrontal cortex that, they claim, assigns values to economic goods and,
they argue, represents their subjective utility independently of the action needed
for their acquisition. Value processing means that single goods are attributed
anticipated values that will be realized at the time of their consumption. The
suggestion is that the orbitofrontal cortex might contain a map for expected
subjective cardinal utility. These findings seem to bear directly on the
conceptual foundations of economics by presenting a potentially promising
three-tiered inference from the observation of neural patterns, the involvement
of a cognitive process (value processing) and its understanding as the psycho-
biological realization of a fundamental theoretical construct of economics,
namely utility. The reverse inference fallacy consists, in this example, to infer
from the activity of some neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex to the cognitive
process of valuation. This reverse inference simply inverts, as we can see, the
hypothesis that performing the task at hand would activate neurons in the
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orbitofrontal cortex which are associated, by previous studies, to the cognitive
process of valuation. This inversion, however, may not be fatal to the asserted
conclusion depending on the confirmation by previous studies of the correlation
between the targeted population of neurons and the intended cognitive process
(value processing). An extra step, beyond the reverse inference fallacy proper,
is to conclude to the observation of the neural basis of the concept of utility.
This study may present the weakest and most widespread form of the reverse
inference fallacy.
2. Ellsberg (1961) evidenced, through a famous paradox of decision-theory, the
different attitudes that are elicited by risky vs. ambiguous situations. Huettel
et al. (2006) detected individual differences in brain activations depending on a
subject’s preferences for risky or ambiguous decision contexts. People who
prefer ambiguity demonstrate increased activity in the prefrontal cortex while
those who prefer risk have increased activity in the parietal cortex. Here we
have a clear instance of neuroeconomics defined as the investigation of the
neural correlates of decision-making. Huettel et al.’s conclusion is underdeter-
mined in the sense that the differentiated brain activities correlated with the
proposed decision contexts may be attributed to the processing of distinct levels
of information rather than of probability contexts proper. The inference from
neural activity to relevant theoretical constructs for economics is more direct in
this case than in the former example. The cognitive process which is inferred to
be correlated with brain activity (processing distinct uncertainty context) and
the economic concepts (risk and ambiguity) at stake are the same. In Padoa-
Schioppia and Assad’s study, ‘‘value processing’’ had a biological sense of its
own which takes a further inference or reduction to make tantamount to the
notion of utility.
3. Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005) have tested, respectively with
brain-lesioned patients and in an fMRI setting, the reaction to two types of
feedback to participants’ choices over pairs of fortune wheels. In one case they
had complete feedback for the wheel they had chosen and the one they had not
chosen. In another case they got only the partial feedback corresponding to the
wheel they had chosen. This difference is supposed to capture the conceptual
distinction between, respectively, regret and disappointment. Notably, regret and
disappointment have been theorized and modeled in decision-theory (Loomes
and Sugden 1982) and considered to be possible explanations of fundamental
decision-theoretic behavioral anomalies such as the Allais paradox. The brain
activities documented by Coricelli et al. (2005) lead them to conclude that the
orbitofrontal cortex has a fundamental role in experiencing regret.
Here again the inference connects three items, as they report correlations
between neural activities in the orbitofrontal cortex and an experimental
construct they call regret and intend, on that basis, to bridge the gap between
those neural activities and the decision-theoretical notions of regret and
disappointment. But there is a specificity in this three-step construction
compared to the clear three-step inference in Assad and Padoa-Schioppia’s
study (neural paterns—psychobiological concept—economic theoretical
Is neuroeconomics doomed by the reverse inference fallacy?
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construct) and the merging of the two last steps in Huettel’s study (neural
patterns—and then an equivalence between the inferred cognitive process and
the theoretical construct, namely ambiguity processing). In Coricelli’s study
there may be a further doubt that the targeted cognitive process labeled in terms
of regret is really involved in performing the task. Indeterminacy looms in
general when one infers from observed neural activities to a specific cognitive
process. However, in the present context, there are obvious other ways to
interpret the alleged psychological processes involved in performing the task
(comparing wheels of fortune) than in the phenomenologically rich term of an
emotion of regret. This would not be a problem if it were a sheer terminological
issue. What Coricelli et al. calls regret is, in a simplified version, what Sugden
and Loomes themselves call regret (and if this was the end of the story we
would have here a case of conceptual collapse similar to the one in Huettel’s
study). The problem is that we can alternatively label the psychological process
that takes place when performing the task in terms of information processing
not associated with any particular emotion. Rationalizing this process in terms
of regret may be unwarranted, even though it fits with the theoretical construct
intended in decision-theory.
4. In a widely discussed article, McClure et al. (2004) examined the brain activity
of participants while they were making a series of intertemporal choices
between small proximal rewards ($ R available at delay d) and larger delayed
rewards ($ R0 available at delay d0), where $ R\ $ R0 and d\ d0. Rewards
ranged from $ 5 to $ 40 Amazon.com gift certificates, and the delay ranged
from the day of the experiment to 6 weeks later. They found that time
discounting is associated with the engagement of two neural systems. Limbic
and paralimbic cortical structures are preferentially recruited for choices
involving immediately available rewards; and fronto-parietal regions, which
support higher cognitive functions, are recruited for all other intertemporal
choices. Moreover, the authors find that when choices involved an opportunity
for a sooner (not strictly immediate) and a later reward, both neural systems are
engaged but an activity in fronto-parietal regions greater than in limbic regions
is associated with choosing larger delayed rewards. This dual, and potentially
conflicting, system in the brain, given its relative activation according to kinds
of delays displayed to the participants, is interpreted by the authors to support a
quasi-hyperbolic functional account of utility-discounting over time. The quasi-
hyperbolic discount function presents a curve with a steep hyperbolic declivity
in the present and very short term and a more constant and less acute
exponential slope from a point in the near future to the far future. McClure
et al.’s dual neural system apparently supports this dual functional form. One
noticeable feature of this original study, though, is its coarse-grainedness in
terms of the neural activities, divided between two large systems of the brain,
that are supposed to account for intertemporal choice behavior (Laibson 1997).
This feature has been targeted by rival accounts of the neural bases of utility
discounting (see Kable and Glimcher 2007) which point to more scattered and
complex neural-subsystems underpinning intertemporal choice behavior. By
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opting for large neural structures, McClure and his colleagues decrease the level
of specificity with which they are actually correlated with intertemporal
decision-making rather than other psychological activities. In that field of study
a safer strategy would be to decompose intertemporal choice behavior into its
various cognitive components (valuation, prospective thought, etc.) and study
their corresponding neural subsystems.
5. Fundamental issues in economics such as equity/efficiency trade-offs have been
directly tackled by means of brain-imaging techniques. Hsu et al. (2008)
combined choices over distributive justice situations, implementing trade-offs
between equitable and efficient donations to actual Ugandese orphans, with
fMRI recordings of overall brain activity during those trade-offs. They were able
to observe salient correlations between neural activities and experimental
situations in which dilemmas between equity and efficiency were implemented.
They report that differentials of equity were processed by the insula, differentials
of efficiency by the putamen, and differentials of utility (defined as a
combination of equity and efficiency) by the caudate nucleus. They manage to
make sense of those correlations by inferring cognitive processes from prior
functional mappings of those brain areas, namely inequity aversion may be
associated with insular activity, calculation with the putamen and reward
processing with caudate nucleus activation. The theoretical constructs (equity
and efficiency) are much plausible labels given the trade-offs involved in the
tasks. There is also no doubt that observed neural activities are correlated with
the distinct typical responses to those tasks. The only concern is with the
specificity of the observed neural activities with respect to the cognitive
processes involved. Inferences from these activities to further characterizations
of the engaged cognitive process are too loose. For instance, the fact that from
what we previously know about which affective or cognitive states are
associated with insular activity we are tempted to infer that dealing with inequity
may tap into deep affective and proprioceptive states such as disgust essentially
relies on Sanfey et al. (2003). There may be a sort of mutual reinforcement
between the reverse inferences drawn in these thematically related studies but
this is still insufficient to remove all qualms about the level of specificity of the
observed neural activities with respect to the intended cognitive processes.
The slippery inferential move in which the reverse inference fallacy consists and
which was found to a variable extent in the above mentioned studies can be plainly
described as (1)–(2)–(3) below. It is a reverse inference by contrast with a properly
ordered one which simply states that if a cognitive process or a mental state X is
engaged, then brain area Z is activated. But what we rather regularly find in reports
of fMRI studies is the alternative sequence:
(1) In the current study at hand, we observe that when task A is performed brain
area Z is activated.
(2) In former studies, when cognitive process X is supposed to be involved, brain
area Z is activated.
(3) Therefore, brain area Z activities in the current study at hand demonstrate the
involvement of cognitive process X by the performance of task A.
Is neuroeconomics doomed by the reverse inference fallacy?
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Compared with the regular inference from cognitive processes to brain activities
which is strategically used in (2), (1)–(3) follows a reverse inference pattern as it
aims at establishing the involvement of a cognitive process on the observational
basis of given brain activities. The inference is invalid as it simply affirms the
consequent. The inference would be valid if (2) was rather asserting a strict
equivalence such as: brain area Z is activated if and only if cognitive process X is
involved in a task. Poldrack (2006) makes a very cogent point about the use of this
fallacious reasoning in a vast array of fMRI studies. It would be tempting to
interpret this regular move in conclusions of fMRI studies as a token of abductive
reasoning which naturally accompanies scientific progress. Abduction can be
described as the attempt to conclude that A given that we observe B and that we
know that A entails B. In quest for an explanation A of an observed phenomenon B,
it is clear that the simple presence of B in nothing more than a probable indication
that A is also currently the case. This reasoning pattern is tantamount to the fallacy
of affirmation of the consequent in logic. As Peirce has originally conceived of it
abduction was supposed to be the inferential process that leads to the formulation of
a hypothesis, not to a logically certain conclusion (Peirce 1878). Such quasi-logical
procedures would then be expected reasoning patterns in an emerging scientific field
such as neuroeconomics and what we often find conclusively stated in that field
would rather be taken, according to Peirce’s recommendations of scientific
methodology, as the hypotheses to test. Some constraints may transform these
logical fallacies into informational processes, given prior background knowledge.
In absence of a lucid assessment of these informational constraints neuroeco-
nomic investigations may rely on what we label a ‘‘same-areas strategy’’: the same
areas that are usually dedicated to the processing of X are also observed to be
activated in the processing of Y; X being a biological or cognitive function
previously mapped onto some brain structures, and Y the currently examined
economic construct. The same are strategy consists then in the mere conjunction of
(1) and (2) above without regard to neural selectivity matters. However, X already
possesses some domain specificity, whereas an important question, which is far
from being solved, is whether Ys—i.e. conceptual constructs or cognitive processes
theoretically associated with the description of economic behavior—can have any.
We analyze in the following section one particular example of a neuroeconomic
study in the light of the informational constraints that bear on the validity of its
conclusions that could help it escape from a seemingly ‘‘same-areas strategy’’.
3 Bayesian constraints on the informativeness of reverse inferences
De Quervain’s article on the neural basis of altruistic punishment (De Quervain
et al. 2004) is a sufficiently elaborate example in order to unravel the sort of internal
inferential links neuroeconomic conclusions rely on. Altruistic punishment is a
concept of evolution theory (see Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002) and one important way of
envisioning neuroeconomics as a promising and growing scientific field is certainly,
as we will show in the final section, to consider that it helps addressing questions
relating to the evolution of social and economic behaviors. Altruistic punishment is
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the fact, reported in laboratory experiments and confirmed by field observations,
that people tend to punish free riders and non cooperators, when they have a chance
to do so in experimental or life settings even if they incur a personal cost of doing so
and even in one-shot situations in which there cannot be a corrective effect of the
administered punition on subsequent social interactions. Investigating the neuro-
biological basis of altruistic punishment is important in order to shed light on the
evolutionary mechanisms that selected such an apparently individually counterpro-
ductive behavior.
Moves (1), (2) and (3) of the above inferential sequence occur in De Quervain’s
presentation of his study. Move (1) is the far most complex one as it has to contain
the description of a task and a report of correlated neural activities. It proceeds by
stating the rule and conditions of an experimental game between two players.
Players are anonymously matched and play a repeated trust game. Punishment is
introduced in the ultimate phase of each period of the repeated game. Namely, each
time the first player is returned a share of a multiplied amount of the money he has
himself previously entrusted to the second player, he can express his potential
discontent over the return by punishing that second player. By spending one
monetary unit on punishment, the first player may deprive the second player of two
monetary units. The first player can spend up to 20 monetary units on punishment.
In De Quervain’s study, the brains of first players are scanned while their trust is
abused by second players and they ponder whether they will inflict punishment to
second players, under various experimental conditions that correspond to the way
punishment can be inflicted. The treatments were Costly Punishment (CP) just as we
described it, Free Punishment (FP) in the sense that the penalties inflicted to the
second players cost nothing to first players, and ‘‘Symbolic’’ Punishment (SP),
which in De Quervain’s particular terminology only meant that players may have
wished to punish free riders but were not actually given the possibility to do so.
Having defined their experimental conditions, the authors state their hypotheses,
which bear on the resulting brain activities when the usual subtractive fMRI
methodology is applied. This consists in making apparent by subtraction (or by
superposition of the average maps of activities in the brain obtained through the
repetition of the tasks) the contrasts between brain activities associated with these
experimental conditions which are designed to be as close as possible except for the
manipulated variable of interest. The resulting contrasts are supposed to be specific
to the first terms of the successive subtractions below:
FP-SP is supposed to activate reward related brain regions.
CP-SP is also hypothesized to activate reward related brain regions.
Now what is observed is that FP-SP and CP-SP activate the caudate nucleus,
which is a reward related brain region. Punishment, at a cost or at no cost, activates
this region of the brain.
Move (2) is simply the reminder that there is well documented evidence of
reward related areas in the brain (nucleus accumbens, nucleus caudate, etc.)
showing that they are activated when subjects get reward in the form of e.g. money,
beautiful faces, or psychoactive drugs.
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Move (3) allegedly concludes that people derive utility from altruistic
punishment. Altruistic punishment is rewarding for subjects. When they have the
opportunity to punish, they experience reward, ‘‘as shown’’ by related brain
activities.
This reverse inferential step is embedded within a broader argument about the
investigation of the proximate neural phenomena that may account for the
evolutionary selection of supposedly widespread altruistic punishment behavior.
The problem is that, as it stands, this inferential step is fallacious and threatens a
broader valuable endeavor.
The initial issue was to assess whether reward related areas in the brain were
activated when subjects have the opportunity to punish. The result is that they are.
But why was this issue intended in the first place? The stated conclusion is that free
and costly punishments are rewarding given the activity of reward related brain
areas when punishment is performed. Our point is not to target a phenomenological
slip, from brain-activities correlated with some experimental constructs to a feeling
of reward, which is actually not very present in that study. The far more problematic
point is that it is fallacious to conclude from the correlation of performances that
have been described in terms of kinds of punishment with reward related brain
activities, to the idea that punishment itself is a reward related behavior. As we said
that logical slip is embedded in an attempt at providing a broader account of the
neurobiological mechanisms that have fostered altruistic punishment and eventually
human cooperation (my emphasis): ‘‘Our study is part of recent attempts in
‘‘neuroeconomics’’ and the ‘‘cognitive neuroscience of social behavior’’ to
understand the social brain and the associated moral emotions. However, this study
sought to identify the neural basis of the altruistic punishment of defectors. The
ability to develop social norms that apply to large groups of genetically unrelated
individuals and to enforce these norms through altruistic sanctions is one of the
distinguishing characteristics of the human species. Altruistic punishment is
probably a key element in explaining the unprecedented level of cooperation in
human societies. We hypothesize that altruistic punishment provides relief or
satisfaction to the punisher and activates, therefore, reward-related brain regions.
Our design generates five contrasts in which this hypothesis can be tested, and the
anterior dorsal striatum is activated in all five contrasts, which suggests that the
caudate plays a decisive role in altruistic punishment.’’
It is clear that the crucial move (3) of the reverse inference fallacy is bluntly
assumed in this introductory assertion. The conclusion is preempted by the
hypothesis that if punishment is rewarding then it activates typical brain regions that
have been previously associated with reward processing. And if a significant
activation of these regions is observed in connection with tasks that implement
altruistic punishment in a unambiguous way, then the assertion that punishment
provides relief or satisfaction seems within reach. But saying that the caudate plays
a role in altruistic punishment does not yet mean that that apparent correlation
between caudate activities and the performance of altruistic punishment anchors the
latter in reward-related activities. It, on the one hand, depends on the level of
functional specificity of that area and, on the other hand, of a better characterization
of the specific sense in which punishment may involve reward rather than some
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other more general theoretical psychological construct that would be common to
reward proper and punishment.
Another example would be Sanfey and his colleagues’ article on the neural basis
of economic decision-making in the ultimatum games which paved the way for
neuroeconomic studies of human cooperation (Sanfey et al. 2003). The argumen-
tative structure of this article is as follows. Involvements of the anterior insula and
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are associated to the performance of the ultimatum
game. This is not problematic as this move (corresponding to move (1) above)
consists in a plain assertion of neural activities). It is more problematic of course
when these activities are subsequently assumed to represent the twin demands of the
Ultimatum Game task, namely the emotional goal of resisting unfairness and the
cognitive goal of accumulating money. But in the light of past functional
investigations of those same brain areas (move (2)), the performance of these tasks
is re-described in terms of some cognitive processes and mental states that have
been associated with those areas. Activities in the insula, in particular, were
associated with autonomic arousal, negative emotional state, anger, physical disgust
(taste and odor) and emotional disgust. Hence a swift inference (move (3)) from
observed activities in the insular cortex to experienced feelings of anger and disgust
when the subject is facing low offers in the game. When such low offers happen to
be accepted, higher activities are observed in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
which has been associated inter alia with the engagement of cognitive control and is
interpreted as indicating that an automatic emotional response has been inhibited.
In spite of this inherent logical failure, neuroeconomic studies that succumb to it
are not necessarily wrongheaded in proceeding in that way. It might be the case that
the intended conclusion is justifiably asserted. But it sometimes seems to be out of
epistemic luck rather than the outcome of a controlled methodology and consider-
ation of the conditions under which one can confidently infer the engagement of
cognitive states on the basis of an observed correlation between some neural patterns
and the performance of given economic decision-making tasks. Reverse inferences
should be considered as spreading over a continuous confidence scale between sheer
hypothetical statements and definite conclusions, depending on some background
conditions. More exactly, reverse inferences vary over the dual dimension of
certainty and informativeness. Given a cognitive process X, a neuronal activity in a
targeted area A, and a performed task T, the probability that X is engaged while A is
observed in T can be classically formalized using Bayes’ theorem:
P X Ajð Þ ¼
PðA Xj ÞPðXÞ
PðA Xj ÞPðXÞ þ PðA Xj ÞPðXÞ
P(A|X) and P(A|*X) constitute the prior information from the existing evidence
base, which inform about selectivity. We focus here on the conditionalization of the
engagement of a cognitive process X (or a mental state, cognitive or affective) on
the observation of some neural patterns, because the inference from the latter to the
former is the main and most common source of incautious reasoning in
neuroeconomics and elsewhere in neuro-studies. One should note that the presence
of X is itself conditioned on the hypothesis that the performance of task T in the
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experiment under scrutiny engages X. Neuroeconomic researchers expect that the
task T they experimentally run will involve a certain cognitive process X. On the
basis of past studies they know that when X was engaged by a task, some brain
activities A were observed. The reverse inference fallacy consists exclusively in this
further step from the observation of brain activities A to the conclusion that X is
engaged. The background expectation that T engages X is part of the overall
research strategy and seems to be retrospectively confirmed by the observation of
brain activities A.
More subtly, it may also be the case that observed brain activities actually
‘‘reveal’’ the presence of cognitive processes alternative to the ones that are
expected to be involved given the task at hand. The point of neuroeconomics is
sometimes to deliver this sort of ‘‘scientific surprise’’. But this clearly relies on the
prior belief that a certain cognitive process is engaged given a certain task. Let’s
note that if the expected cognitive process X given task T is the same cognitive
process X which is inferred from brain activities A, we have what we define as a set
of coherent cognitive expectations. More precisely, a tacit expectation (the
correlation between cognitive process X and task T) is confirmed by the observation
of brain activities A, given that such activities have been previously correlated with
the similar hypothetical presence of cognitive process X. However, as we just said,
investigative strategies in neuroeconomics may rely on actually discrepant cognitive
expectations when task-performance and brain activities are alternatively consid-
ered. The usual strategy is to tacitly or explicitly assume that cognitive process X is
associated with task T at hand, and, then, to put retrospectively this assumption in
doubt when it is observed that actual brain activities A rather indicate (on the basis
of a reverse inference) that cognition process Y or complex cognitive process
X ? Z seem to be involved. Now given that both types of correlation between T and
X, or A and Y, or A and X ? Z are based on uncertain conditionalization
procedures it makes the intended surprise more or less genuine.
This overall strategy and the conditional series it contains (X given T, as a
background hypothesis, followed by a confirming or disconfirming X given A, on
the basis of a reverse inference) can be made sounder by unraveling the
informational priors contained in this reasoning pattern. The main problem, as we
can see, is the conditionalization of an expected X (or of any other less expected
cognitive process) over a pattern of observed neural activities A. The degree of
belief that we can soundly attach to the reverse inference from A to X depends on
what is called the selectivity of the neural response (see Poldrack 2006). The
selectivity of brain activation is inversely correlated with its involvement across all
possible experimental tasks, and therefore possible cognitive processes. The more a
neural response is involved in a vast array of tasks and processes, the less the
inference from that neural response to the engagement of a specific cognitive
process or mental state is plausible.
The amount of selectivity of the neural response is then crucial in order to
propagate certainty between the two levels of inference that we have outlined. Low
selectivity of A will retrospectively weaken the likeliness of X given T. This will of
course be a problem for the neuroeconomist whose strategy is based upon what we
have called a coherent set of cognitive expectations, hypothesizing that X/T and
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then citing evidence that X/A. But for the one whose tacit or explicit agenda is the
disconfirmation of the generally admitted X/T by showing that in fact T ¼) A and
A ¼) Y, a low selectivity of A will also ruin his strategy as the inference of Y from
A will lack significance and will be orthogonal to the presence of X. Basically,
according to the degree to which a region of interest in the brain is selectively
activated when the engagement of cognitive process X is hypothesized, the more
confident one can be in the reverse inference that cognitive process X is engaged
when that region of the brain is activated. The problem is that the measure of neural
response selectivity is itself far from simple, stable and reliable.
One would rather have already well-considered notions of where to look in the
brain in order to use the criterion of neural response selectivity as an enhancing
factor of one’s intended reverse inferences. In social neuroscience and, more
especially, in neuroeconomics, the point is seldom raised and the level of ‘‘brain
region’’ and its functional associations is generally adopted without any further
discriminative ado. However, in cases in which the question at hand has been
structured over the activation of a specific set of neurons the issue of the neural
response selectivity more naturally arises. Let’s take an example of a critical
assessment of the neural response selectivity factor in a context where the authors
seek to establish new functional correlations between brain areas and some human
cognitive capacities. Bastiaansen et al. (2009) have wondered whether the mirror
neurons system which allows us to anticipate others’ motor behavior is also
involved in the simulation of their emotions. This supposes that the selectivity of an
identified set of neurons to motor tasks is strong enough and sufficiently stable
across several similar tasks. But it also implies that this same set of neurons will
equally be activated over tasks of a very different nature, related now to the
decoding of others’ emotions. A seeming paradox immediately arises: if this same
set of neurons is both involved in the mirroring of motor and emotional behaviors,
its selectivity will logically decrease. Bypassing such difficulties is crucial to the
pursuit of one of the currently active programs in neuroeconomics which aims to
anchor our understanding of cognitive processes involved in coordination games in
precise mirroring and mentalizing neuronal systems in the brain (Coricelli and
Nagel 2009).
Recent neuroeconomic studies of coordination games have thus taken advantage
of the precisely established correlations between populations of neurons in several
brain areas and mental processes in an attempt to validate theoretical models of how
people solve coordination problems. But the gap between game-theoretical models
and specific populations of neurons remains unbridgeable if one cannot validate all
the methodological intermediate steps from the latter to the former. For example,
Coricelli and Nagel (2009) report having identified the neural substrates of
strategizing in a ‘‘beauty contest’’ game. They present their data as showing that
successful strategic reasoning in that game correlates with neural activity in the
medial prefrontal cortex. Adequate reasoning is inferred when behavioral answers
happen to conform to a theoretical model that accounts for rational solutions in
‘‘beauty contest’’ games. As they actually observe increased activities in the
prefrontal cortex when people exhibit that type of behavior, authors interpret their
data as supporting that theoretical model. These steps may look bold by comparison
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with the methodological meticulousness that has been displayed in neural studies of
mentalization and social cognition in general. But it does not mean that those results
and conclusions are to be a priori discarded upon the motive of their partial reliance
on these anterior studies, as it may precisely be the case that neuronal activities in
the medial prefrontal cortex enjoy a high level of selectivity under the performance
of such coordination games. The problem is that the question is not explicitly
addressed in the discussion of the results and we generally remain uncertain as to the
selectivity of an observed neural response with respect to a given task, weakening
the inference that can subsequently be drawn to the fact that we have actually
observed the neural substrates of an intended cognitive process.
One way for neuroeconomic studies to avoid external reliance on previously
acquired data with respect to the correlation between pinpointed neural activities
and cognitive and affective processes that are important for neuroeconomics would
be that experimental paradigms in that discipline generate their own measure of
neural selectivity. So-called repetition suppression paradigms have been used, in the
context of the investigation of low level brain processes such as perception, in order
to determine the selectivity of a region. Repetition suppression is a reduction of
neural response that can be observed when stimuli are presented several times.
Many functional investigations of brain areas have taken advantage of the
phenomenon of repetition suppression to probe the sensitivity of those areas to
variable stimuli.
This methodology is not confined to the investigation of most basic brain
functions and can be applied to assess the involvement of affective and cognitive
processes that have relevance in neuroeconomics. Jeankins et al. (2008) examine
repetition suppression of a brain region, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPC),
in elaborate cognitive tasks that consist in the introspection of one’s own mental
states vs. inferences about whether other persons are having similar mental states.
The neural bases of the human mentalizing ability have immediate neuroeconomic
importance in order to clarify the cognitive basis of strategizing as it is captured by
game-theory (Singer and Fehr 2005). In particular it is interesting to know whether
the understanding of others’ thoughts and intentions crucially depends on a
projection onto others of our own thoughts and intentions. Jenkins and her colleagues
use alternatively self vs. other-directed judgment tasks systematically followed by an
other-directed judgment task. They note that a repetition-related suppression of
neural activity in the vMPC occurs when the second other-directed judgment is
elicited, whether it has been preceded by a self- or by an other-directed judgment.
This result shows that thinking about others depends on introspective capacities. An
assessment of the selectivity of the functional vMPC response vis-a`-vis the targeted
dual cognitive process on the basis of previous extant studies is here optional as the
suppression phenomenon provides an internal criterion of that correlation.
4 Ontological problems for neuroeconomists
The assessment of the selectivity of neural responses depends among other things on
the access to databases and meta-analyses. One has only partial access to such
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databases and some cognitive and mental processes may be over-represented while
others are only scarcely studied. Those databases have been labeled ‘‘cognitive
ontologies’’ and can be simply defined as functional mappings between cognitive
processes and functions, on the one side, and anatomical structures of the brain, on
the other side Price and Friston 2005; Poldrack 2006; Christoff and Owen 2006).
Extant ‘cognitive ontologies’3 do not contain entries for economic theoretical
constructs. Their elaboration was guided by the unfolding of a functional
architecture of the brain, reflecting current working assumptions about human
cognition. Cognitive ontologies connect an anatomical level with a cognitive
functional level: a problem is then is the granularity level at which a neural response
is envisioned. What is the required scale? Is it the neuron or the functionally defined
area? The more physiologically fine-grained the nature of the response, one could
presume, the more reliable the prediction of a given mental process, given that
selectivity, intuitively, co-varies with the size of the neural sample. However, this
may amount to a naı¨ve view of functional organization in the brain as a high level of
response variability at the neuron scale may not thwart a high level of functional
selectivity at a more regional scale. This is at least a question that is meticulously
raised by leading researchers of the issue of neural response selectivity for the type
of mental processes about which a large set of data has been gathered. Logothetis
and his team, in particular, have even investigated whether neurons in primate
inferotemporal cortex respond selectively to complex, often meaningful, stimuli
such as faces and objects and are stable from 1 day to the other (Bondar et al. 2009).
They found that those neurons maintained their selectivity in both response
magnitude and patterns across a large array of visual images throughout periods that
sometimes exceeded 2 weeks.
One complication in view of the functional cartography of the brain is that there
is no one–one correspondence between brain activities—at whatever scale they are
envisioned—and cognitive processes. Functional brain-imaging has fostered a view
of the brain which is quite in line with the multi-realizability of mental states thesis
that had been advanced in philosophy of mind in the 1970s (e.g. Fodor 1974). There
is a wide degree of overlap among the different neural systems that are activated by
tasks that have no apparent cognitive components in common, which suggests that a
given neural system can ‘‘realize’’ several functions. This could be considered an
extra source of indeterminacy when a specific area is known to underpin several
functions. In that case, even if the selectivity of that neural response is granted for
those functions, the particular association of that response with a cognitive process
will remain uncertain. To solve this problem some neuroscientists use a further
criterion of connectivity (Price and Friston 2005). Neural connectivity refers to a
pattern of anatomical links (‘‘anatomical connectivity’’), of statistical dependencies
(‘‘functional connectivity’’) or of causal interactions (‘‘effective connectivity’’)
between distinct units within a nervous system. The units may vary in scale, from
individual neurons, to neuronal populations, or anatomically segregated brain
regions. Neural activity, and by extension brain functions, are constrained by
3 As a relevant example one can refer to the ongoing database project brainmap.org, which can compute
activation likelihood estimations.
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connectivity.There will indeed be a limited range of functions that an area can
perform if we fix its internal and external connectivity. In other terms, the set of
stable coincident activations within and without a targeted area across a specific task
may provide a wider observational basis to map more finely cognitive processes and
brain functioning. Fixed states of neural connectivity in the brain help to increase
the accuracy of cognitive ontologies. The point, then, for a neuroeconomist to avoid
the reverse inference fallacy, should be to check that his conclusion from a brain
activity to a cognitive process falls within the scope of a local ontology. One
requisite for this approach is then that neuroeconomics have as clear a preliminary
idea as possible of what cognitive processes are worth studying in their perspective.
Neuroeconomics could be defined as the investigation of the neural bases of
economic decision-making. But the use of cognitive ontologies may refine this plain
definition and incite neuroeconomists to reach an understanding of how some brain
structures may have become specifically involved in aspects of economically
relevant behavior. How the brain adapted to economic environments and how, if
ever, it became partly functionally specialized to deal with those features of
environments and related behaviors that economic science models should be, in my
view, the main concern of neuroeconomics, But the pursuit of that goal depends on
tight intermediary correlations between precise cognitive ontologies and a high
selectivity of associated neural responses. The usual investigative strategy in
neuroeconomics which consists in observing presumable neural correlates of some
hypothesized cognitive process or, even more directly, to some theoretical
construct, remains defensible under the dual condition that the neural response
selectivity and a cognitive ontology are granted.
So when a prediction is formed about which area of the brain will be activated
under the performance of task T, or which cognitive process is involved given brain
activity A, the functional associations that have been previously set with respect to
that brain area or those brain activities are determinant. They constitute a
background knowledge, which is sometimes cursorily referred to but still guides the
neuroeconomist’s explicit investigative strategy and give potential weight to
the more implicit conditional inferences on which this strategy relies. So the
characterization of task T (which among the three place-holders A, X, T of the
inference is the one we have least discussed so far) according to its alleged cognitive
domain increases the viability of an intended reverse inference. However, does it
make sense to associate economically relevant tasks with specific cognitive
domains, and is it methodologically and strategically sound to do so if the purpose
of economics is precisely to investigate the neural bases of economic decision-
making and hope to reach a high level of specificity?
Tasks are swiftly assigned cognitive domains: memory tasks, linguistic tasks,
attention tasks, and so on. This initial assignment helps form expectations about
which area of the brain will be activated by their performance given that it is
established that some regions show selective neural responses with respect to such
cognitive domains. Broca’s area is for example well known to be selectively
activated in language tasks by comparison with tasks which do not involve linguistic
performance. By contrast the insular cortex is known to be involved in negative
emotional and autonomic arousal contexts but it probably crosses over emotional
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domains whose boundaries are hard to define. Even more clearly, some regions of
the brain, like the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, have little domain-specificity. So
tasks that would be defined only by their presumed cognitive domain and that would
activate such low selective regions would constitute a poor starting point in view of
a credible reverse inference. The case is even worse when no specific cognitive
domain can be assigned to the task and the strategy is purely explorative in terms of
correlation of type of performance and brain areas which have a variable degree of
selectivity.
Examples of such loose associations abound in neuroeconomics and have given
rise to legitimate attacks by authors who could easily pinpoint abuses of conceptual
overlaps or reductionist attempts between theoretically separate fields (Gul and
Pesendorfer 2008). Some of the neuroeconomic studies we have mentioned in Sect.
2 may happen to be sufficiently grounded if the neural selectivity and a fine
connective functional mapping of the targeted area grant a reverse inference from
those activities to the cognitive processes. But besides granting the likelihood of
reverse inferences, cognitive ontologies fulfill two further roles in the typical
neuroeconomic strategy: (1) selecting a cognitive process for which it will make
sense to presume its engagement in the task and its correlation with the observed
neural response, and (2) ensuring that this intended cognitive process has relevance
in neuroeconomic and, plainly, economic theorizing. The difficulty that may arise
from these demands is that their joint fulfillment may yield the impression,
sometimes not intended, of an attempt at metaphysically reducing theoretical
economic constructs to neural activities.
Not only a reminder of methodological safety, but one of metaphysical clarity, is
then in order. Reductionism claims not only that all natural kinds are co-extensive
with physical natural kinds, but that those co-extensions are nomologically
necessary. In Fodor’s terms and example: bridge laws between separate scientific
descriptions of reality are actual laws; so, if Gresham’s law is true, it follows that
there is a (bridge) law of nature such that ‘x is a monetary exchange , x is P’,
where P is a term for a physical natural kind’’ (Fodor 1974). An instance of
Gresham’s law is obviously a worldly fact which is an aggregate of physical
phenomena. However, an economic law is not reducible to physics in the
proprietary sense of reduction involved in claims for the unity of science for the
same reasons that psychology can not be reduced to neurology. Fodor argues that
psychological laws, first, have exceptions and, second, are multi-realizable,
resulting in uninformative potentially infinitely disjunctive bridge laws of reduction
of psychological types to neural types. Now if one takes behavioral economics as a
mix of economics and psychology the argument, a fortiori, applies.
The choice of a cognitive ontology in neuroeconomics is tricky, first, because the
intended cognitive processes do not a priori belong to one single specific cognitive
domain, and, second, because they are high-level processes whose neural underpin-
nings may be more difficult to selectively assign compared with those of lower
mental functions. Another pressing issue is that those cognitive processes, whatever
theoretical domain they fall into, have a high level of complexity which may
complicate the assessment of their neural response selectivity. But it has also been
suggested that an estimate of cognitive complexity for a given task may solve the
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reverse inference problem when this task triggers a lowly selective neural response
(Christoff and Owen 2006). Cognitive complexity has been defined in several ways:
parallel processing of sub-tasks, load of working memory, temporal and hierarchical
unfolding of a plan, and so on. The analysis of the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex
activations, for instance, which is an area of apparent low selectivity, show that those
activations are positively correlated with task-complexity. Brain regions can be
differentiated by their selectivity not only to types of tasks, when the cognitive
characteristics of these tasks are clearly identified, but also to particular aspects or
properties of tasks such as their complexity, especially for those which do not a priori
fall within a well determined cognitive domain.
Finally it could be stated that solving the reverse inference issue consists in
developing a clear preview of the structural organization of the brain in response to
tasks that are of interest for the behavioral economist. Only provided these
preliminary functional hypotheses, can drawing inferences from brain activities to
the engagement of specific cognitive processes in the performance of economic
tasks make sense. But it should also be the aim of brain-imaging studies in
economics to contribute an answer to the more fundamental question of whether our
brain has developed responses that became specific to the economic domain. De
Quervain et al. (2004) article on the neural basis of altruistic punishment which we
discussed above actually goes into that direction, its main lesson being that to deal
with unfair economic exchanges and reinstate cooperative norms an efficient
strategy is to punish free riders even at a personal cost. This is one behavioral device
that helped human survival because it was crucial to install norms of cooperation in
environments too complex to be individually coped with. The fact that the
administration of such altruistic punishment correlates with neural activities in some
structures of the reward system is seen as optimal from an evolutionary point of
view, in the sense that something painful—incurring a financial cost—would be
processed as something pleasurable.
This relates to the second aspect of why cognitive ontologies are especially
problematic in neuroeconomics. The cognitive processes that are involved by tasks
that make up neuroeconomic experimental paradigms not only should have enough
neural selectivity, but also some relevance in view of economic theorizing. In the
vein of De Quervain’s or other studies, we want to emphasize a possible strategy in
neuroeconomics that would be driven by a self-conscious concern on how neural
activities became specialized to deal with behaviors and cognitive processes that
would clearly mark the cognitive ontology of neuroeconomics. It is nevertheless the
case that modern economic environments and artifacts (such as money or labor
contracts) are too recent to have influenced brain anatomy by evolution. If they
receive a specialized and invariant treatment in the brain—as it is the tacit
assumption in a lot of neuroeconomic studies—one should find a plausible
explanation of that apparent evolutionary riddle according to which selective neural
responses may have been evolutionarily selected in correlation with such artificial
and recent behavioral and cognitive patterns. Or if one says that those neural
responses simply correlate with mental processes that happen to be engaged in the
performance of tasks that have some degree of relevance to neuroeconomics, one
eschews the question of the epistemological purpose of connecting, along reverse
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inferential logical patterns, neural responses, cognitive processes, and economic
theoretical constructs.
Brain mechanisms, however, are ‘plastic’ enough to have adapted to some
recently appeared stimuli, at the scale of human history. Brain plasticity refers to the
ability of the brain to undergo structural and functional changes. It is a necessary
process that allows our brain to learn from our environment and implement adaptive
functional revisions. The anatomy of the brain could not have been influenced by
recent economic environments given their too recent historical apparition. But we
can conceive that the brain recycled some of its anciently implemented circuits in
order to address the new set of stimuli provided by economic contexts and to
functionally adapt to these novel cultural artifacts and settings. There is a shortage
of data to currently support this hypothesis in the case of economic artifacts but it
has been amply demonstrated in other cultural contexts such as reading and
arithmetic (Dehaene and Cohen 2008). This evolutionary perspective may shift the
most common research strategy in neuroeconomics from the reporting of alleged
correlations between some neural patterns and some economic theoretical constructs
to an inquiry on how some cognitive processes typically associated with solving
economic tasks may have become associated with selective neural responses.
The hypothesis of a cultural recycling of cortical maps was put forward to make
sense of a seemingly neurobiological paradox. As Dehaene and Cohen (2007) put it:
‘‘Part of the human cortex is specialized for cultural domains such as reading and
arithmetic, whose invention is too recent to have influenced the evolution of our
species. (…) To explain this paradoxical cerebral invariance of cultural maps, we
propose a neuronal recycling hypothesis, according to which cultural inventions
invade evolutionarily older brain circuits and inherit many of their structural
constraints’’. In what does the facilitation consist and what sort of inherited
constraints can affect the neural processing of cultural inventions? Central to Dehaene
and Cohen’s formulation of their hypothesis is the concept of a cortical map. Maps are
invariant brain structures. At various possible scales, cortical maps reflect in an
isomorphic way the representational structure of the targeted cultural item. These
neuronal layouts have been shaped by evolution and are genetically constrained.
Epigenetic factors in the early phase of the individual’s development finalize the
cortical structures that will react in an invariant way to some external stimuli. There
thus occurs a compromise between genetic constraints, cortical relative plasticity, and
the frequency and tractable structure of encountered stimuli. When neural observa-
tions collected through particular neuroeconomic studies can be related to such a
hypothesis about the specific functional evolution of targeted brain areas, there is a
possibility to reduce the inferential gaps between neural selectivity and the
engagement of cognitive processes, on the one hand, and between the cognitive
processes and their relevance to economic theoretical constructs on the other hand.
5 Conclusion
Relative lack of caution with the reverse inference fallacy leads some neuroeconomic
investigations to seemingly rely on what was labeled above a ‘‘same-areas strategy’’:
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the same areas that are usually dedicated to the processing of X are also observed to
be activated in the processing of Y; X being a biological or cognitive function
previously mapped onto some brain structures, and Y the currently examined
economic construct. The shift between X and Y is problematic and if Y belongs to the
description of economic behavior, in most cases it will be objectionable to say that Y
and X share a common neural basis. This assertion would imply a (most often
unwanted) reductionist approach, but also, most likely, a poor assessment of the
selectivity of the observed neural response in view of granting the engagement of Y
in the task at hand. X already possesses some domain specificity, whereas an
important question, which is far from being solved, is whether Ys—i.e. conceptual
constructs or cognitive processes theoretically associated with the description of
economic behavior—can have any. Neuroeconomics may be seen as the study of
neural correlates of behaviors that involve some cognitive and affective functions
which are not specific to economic cognition, for the simple reason that there could
not be such a functional description of those processes involved in economic
behavior. Nevertheless, it is not vain to try to correlate economic theoretical
constructs to identified neural patterns through the performance of certain cognitive
or affective functions as the concerned areas may have shown enough plasticity
across recent brain evolution to encode economically relevant behavior.
In the first section of this article, we have recalled what the reverse inference
fallacy amounts to. In the second section, specific Bayesian constraints were outlined
on the use of reverse inferences in neuroeconomics to make its conclusions more
compelling. The argumentative strategy of De Quervain’s investigation of the neural
bases of altruistic punishment was detailed and informational constraints were spelled
out in order for it to acquire more conclusiveness. An alternative experimental
strategy—the use of repetition suppression paradigms—was also suggested, which
presumably avoids overreliance on preliminary data about a given neural response’s
selectivity. In Sect. 4 the use and relevance of cognitive ontologies in neuroeconomics
were discussed. Cognitive ontologies involve a double difficulty: the complexity of
the engaged cognitive processes and the irrelevance of those processes vis-a`-vis
economic theorizing. Solutions to these two problems were suggested. Respectively,
complexity may be an asset in order to increase our confidence in the selectivity of
certain brain regions, and brain areas or neural responses that have been designed
through long term evolution to process ancient human cognitive functions and
behaviors may have optimally adapted to deal with modern economic situations.
Some future neuroeconomics studies may be aligned with this ‘‘cultural recycling of
cortical niches’’ approach. Granted this approach, possible alternative experimental
strategies, and an increased attention to cognitive ontologies and neural selectivity,
neuroeconomics may indeed grow as a sound scientific field.
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